The art. 339, par. 3, c.p.c., through a simple adverb ("only"), would seem to limit the control of the Court of second instance only to law aspects of the decision made by the Justice of peace. However, beyond the laconic provision just mentioned, the legislature has not dictated specific predictions. This circumstance, together with the placement of the article among those dedicated to the appeal, suggests that - in the intention of the legislature - the new institution would still be governed by the ordinary rules laid down by the appellate proceeding. Hence the problem of determining whether, in the judgment of the second instance adverse equity decision of the Justice of the peace, may be deducted errors related to the assessment of the evidence and the findings of the extraprocedural fact, as well as the nova (of course, in the narrow limits of the art. 345 c.p.c.) and the revocation’s vices of of the judgment under appeal. The Author attempts to provide a positive response, through an interpretation of the art. 339, par. 3, c.p.c. in conformity with the constitutional guarantee of the effectiveness of the right of action and defense of the parties.
L’art. 339, 3° comma, c.p.c., attraverso un semplice avverbio (“esclusivamente”) sembrerebbe limitare il controllo del giudice di secondo grado ai soli profili di diritto della decisione resa dal giudice di pace. Tuttavia, al di là della laconica previsione appena richiamata, il legislatore non ha dettato delle specifiche previsioni. Tale circostanza, unitamente alla collocazione della norma nel capo dedicato all’appello, suggerisce che – nelle intenzioni del legislatore – il nuovo istituto resterebbe comunque regolato dalla ordinaria disciplina dettata per il giudizio di appello. Da qui il problema di stabilire se, nel giudizio di secondo grado avverse le sentenze d’equità del giudice di pace, possano essere dedotti gli errori attinenti alla valutazione delle prove e alla ricostruzione dei fatti extraprocessuali, oltre che i nova (ovviamente, nei ristretti limiti previsti dall’art. 345 c.p.c.) ed i vizi revocatori della sentenza impugnata. L’a. tenta di fornire una risposta positiva, attraverso una interpretazione adeguatrice dell’art. 339, 3° comma, c.p.c. alla garanzia costituzionale dell’effettività del diritto di azione e di difesa delle parti.
L'appello sulle decisioni equitative del giudice di pace
MARTINO, ROBERTO
2014-01-01
Abstract
The art. 339, par. 3, c.p.c., through a simple adverb ("only"), would seem to limit the control of the Court of second instance only to law aspects of the decision made by the Justice of peace. However, beyond the laconic provision just mentioned, the legislature has not dictated specific predictions. This circumstance, together with the placement of the article among those dedicated to the appeal, suggests that - in the intention of the legislature - the new institution would still be governed by the ordinary rules laid down by the appellate proceeding. Hence the problem of determining whether, in the judgment of the second instance adverse equity decision of the Justice of the peace, may be deducted errors related to the assessment of the evidence and the findings of the extraprocedural fact, as well as the nova (of course, in the narrow limits of the art. 345 c.p.c.) and the revocation’s vices of of the judgment under appeal. The Author attempts to provide a positive response, through an interpretation of the art. 339, par. 3, c.p.c. in conformity with the constitutional guarantee of the effectiveness of the right of action and defense of the parties.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
